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This is the second of a two-part article examining
the right of confrontation. Part II focuses on the relationship between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.

In the absence of an exception, the hearsay rule
prohibits the admission of evidence of a
declarant's out-of-court statements if the statements are offered tor the truth of the assertions
contained therein. See Fed. R. Evid. 801; Ohio R.
Evid. 801. If a statement is not offered tor the truth
of the assertion, the hearsay rule is not violated.
Nor, according to the Supreme Court, is the Confrontation Clause. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 88 (1970) ("Neither a hearsay nor a confrontation question would arise had [the witness'] testimony been used to prove merely that the statement was made."). It should be noted, however,
that the probability that a statement may be used
by the jury to establish the truth of the assertions
therein may trigger a confrontation issue even
though the evidence was not technically offered
tor that purpose. See Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123
(1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
Because a hearsay declarant is, in effect, a "witness," a literal application of the Confrontation
Clause would preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay statement, notwithstanding
the applicability of a recognized hearsay exception. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected
this view. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63
(1980) ("[l]f thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result
long rejected as unintended and too extreme.'.'). On
the other hand, the Confrontation Clause could be
interpreted as requiring only the right to crossexamine in-court witnesses and not out-of-court
declarants. This was Wigmore's view. See 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
Under this view, all recognized hearsay exceptions

would be upheld in the face of a confrontation
challenge. The Court has also rejected this view.
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed
to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common Jaw. Our
decisions have never established such a congruence;
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of
confrontation values even though the statements in
issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
hearsay exception .... The converse is equally true:
merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a
long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have
been denied. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56
(1970).

See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It
seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule
stem from the same roots. But this Court has
never equated the two, and we decline to do so
now.").

In some cases, the Court has held the Confrontation Clause violated by the admission of evidence that fell within a traditional hearsay exception. E.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (former testimony exception); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (former testimony)_ In other cases, the
Court has upheld the admissibility of evidence that
did not fall within a traditional exception. E.g.,
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (expansive coconspirator exception); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970) (substantive use of prior inconsistent statements).
Thus, it can safely be said that the Court has
not adopted either of the extreme views of the
Confrontation Clause. Explaining what the Court
has not done is a far easier task than explaining
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what it has done. As one commentator has remarked:

evidencing a view that the Confrontation Clause is
designed to protect against convictions based on
unreliable evidence. See generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified
Theory of Evidence tor Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 567 (1978).

Few tasks in criminal evidence are more perplexing
than to describe the effect of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment upon the hearsay
doctrine. Signals from the Supreme Court point in
different directions; the views of commentators differ;
and while the subject is potentially as vast as the
hearsay doctrine itself, benchmarks in the form of
authoritative decisions are few and far between. 4 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 123 (1980).

UNAVAILABILITY
The first prong in the Roberts analysis provides
that the right of confrontation "normally requires a
showing that the [declarant] is unavailable." /d. at
66. Explaining this requirement, the Court wrote:

See a/so 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence ~800[04], at 800-20 (1981) ("The Court has
not spoken clearly on confrontation issues, and a
number of the opinions are difficult to reconcile");
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 772
(1981) ("Today the relationship of the confrontation
clause and the hearsay rule is to say the least confused."). Perhaps the best place to start is with the
Court's latest pronouncement on the subject, Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
,1''

[l]n conformance with the Framers' preference for
face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including
cases where prior cross-examination has occurred),
the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant. /d. at 65.

The preference tor in-court confrontation and
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses has
long been recognized by the Court. In an early
case the Court stated that the Clause requires

OHIO V. ROBERTS
Herschel Roberts was charged with forging a
check and possession of stolen credit cards. At
the preliminary hearing, the defense called Anita
Isaacs, the daughter of the owner of the credit
cards and check, apparently tor the purpose of
showing that she "had given [the defendant]
checks and the credit cards without informing him
that she did not have permission to use them.
Anita, however, denied this." /d. at 58. At trial
Roberts testified that Anita had given him permission to use the credit cards and check. On rebuttal
the prosecution introduced Anita's preliminary
hearing testimony. Prior to trial the prosecution
had issued subpoenas, without success, to compel
her attendance, and at trial her mother testified
that her whereabouts were unknown. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony violated the
defendant's right of confrontation. State v.
Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978).
Tlie U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
In Roberts the Court provided the following standard tor determining the constitutionality of hearsay statements:

a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief. Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895).

See a/so Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)
("The right to confrontation is basically a trial
right. It includes both the opportunity to crossexamine and the occasion tor the jury to weigh the
demeanor of the witness.").

Test for Determining Unavailability
The test tor determining the unavailability of the
declarant was first set forth in Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968), in which the Court held: "[A] witness is not 'unavailable' tor purposes tor the ...
confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain
his presence at trial." /d. at 724-25. In Roberts the
Court reaffirmed this test and added the following
explanation:

In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent
a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. /d. at 66.

The law does not require the doing of a futile act.
Thus, if no possibility of procuring the witness exists
(as, for example, witness' intervening death), "good
faith" demands nothing of the prosecution. But if
there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative
measures might produce the declarant, the obligation
of good faith may demand their effectuation. "The
lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce
a witness ... is a question of reasonableness." ...
The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good faith efforts undertaken prior
to trial to locate and present that witness. As with
other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution bears
the burden of establishing this predicate. /d. at 74-75.

Thus, the Confrontation Clause appears to require
both the unavailability of the declarant and some
indicia establishing the reliability of the hearsay
statement. The unavailability requirement is a procedural requirement, manifesting a preference tor
in-court testimony subject to oath, cross-examination, and jury observation of demeanor. The reliability requirement is a substantive requirement,

Because the extent of the effort that the prosecution must make in order to comply with the unavailability requirement is a question of reasonableness, courts may disagree as to whether the
2

Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567,
584-85 n.43 (1978); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 1070-74 (1981).
Fifth, the witness could simply refuse to testify,
notwithstanding the absence of a valid privilege.
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970);
U.S. v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Bailey,
581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978). Such a witness could
be held in contempt. See State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohi.o
St.2d 201, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980); State v. Antill, 176
Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). Whether or not
the witness' conduct is found to be contumacious,
the refusal makes the witness' testimony unavailable.
Sixth, the witness' testimony may be unavailable
due to a lack of memory. This was the situation in
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See also
U.S. v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977}, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978). In this type of case, the
. witness would have to be called, placed under
oath, and examined as to the lack of memory.

standard has been satisfied in particular cases. Indeed, Roberts presented such a situation. The
Ohio court of appeals found the prosecution's efforts to be inadequate under the Barber standard,
_ while the Ohio Supreme Court reached the op'
posite conclusion. State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d
191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). Similarly, a majority of
the Supreme Court held the unavailability showing
adequate, but the dissenting Justices found that
additional efforts could have been attempted. 448
U.S. at 77-82. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204 (1972).
Reasons for Unavailability
A witness may be unavailable at trial for a number of different reasons, each of which will affect
the prosecution's obligation to produce the witness. Before considering the various reasons, it
should be noted that if the witness' unavailability
is attributable to the prosecution, the Confrontation Clause would preclude the use of the witness'
hearsay statements. See Motes v. U.S., 178 U.S.
458 (1900).
First, a witness may be unavailable because his
present whereabouts are unknown. This was the
situation in Roberts, now the controlling case for
determining the diligence of prosecutorial efforts
required in such a situation. See also State v.
Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, 415 N.E.2d 272 (1980).
At the very least, Roberts establishes that the issuance of subpoenas alone is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional test. Second, the witness may
&, be dead. In this situation Roberts indicates that
I' "'good faith' demands nothing of the prosecution"
(except producing sufficient evidence of death).
See also Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Third,
the witness may be ill at the time of trial. In this
situation, a continuance may resolve problems associated with a temporary infirmity. See U.S. v.
Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977); Peterson v. U.S., 344
F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. State, 40
Ohio App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931); C. McCormick,
Evidence 610 (2d ed. 1972) ("A mere temporary disability appears not to conform with the standard
established by Barber v. Page."). Another solution
would be to take the witness' testimony in the presence of the jury at the hospital or witness' home.
See State v. Lamonge, 117 Ohio App. 143, 191
N.E.2d 207 (1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St.
545, 190 N.E.2d 691 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
942 (1963).
Fourth, the witness may claim a valid privilege,
such as the privilege against self-incrimination.
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970);
U.S. v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v.
Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1976). Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the prosecution is obliged to grant the witness immunity. See
t._·_
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 101 n.2 (1970) (J. Mar!111 shall, dissenting); U.S. v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282,
1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio
App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of

Finally, the witness may be beyond the subpoena power of the trial court. Barber v. Page
makes clear that this ground alone is not constitutionally sufficient. In that case the witness, whose
preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at the
state trial, was incarcerated in a federal prison in
another state at the time of trial. The Court pointed out that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) empowered federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum at the request of state prosecutorial
authorities and that the policy of the U.S. Bureau
of Prisons was to honor such writs issued by state
courts. 390 U.S. at 724. Because the prosecution
had failed to use any of these means to secure the
attendance of the witness, the Court found a confrontation violation. In a footnote the Court noted
that "the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings provides a means by which prosecuting
authorities from one State can obtain an order
from a court in the State where the witness is
found directing the witness to appear in court in
the first State to testify." /d. at 723 n. 4. See also
Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
One other case deserves comment. In Manc.usi
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), the defendant challenged the prosecution's failure to produce a witness, an American national, who was permanently
residing in Sweden at the time of a retrial. In the
absence of the witness, the trial court admitted
the witness' testimony given at the first trial. The
Court found no constitutional violation.
Upon discovering that [the witness] resided in a
foreign nation, the State of Tennessee, so far as this
record shows, was powerless to compel his attendance at the second trial, either through its own process or through established procedures depending on
the voluntary assistance of another government. ...
We therefore hold that the predicate of unavailability
was sufficiently stronger here than in Barber that a
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an expansive coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule recognized by the Georgia courts.
A plurality of the Supreme Court held that the
Confrontation Clause had not been infringed
because:

federal habeas court was not warranted in upsetting
the determination of the state trial court as to [the
witness'] unavailability. /d. at 212-13.

Despite the Court's attempt to distinquish Barber,
Mancusi v. Stubbs appears to water-down the
Barber "actual unavailability" standard because,
as Justice Marshall noted in dissent, the prosecution never attempted to contact the witness in order to secure his voluntary attendance. Stubbs,
perhaps can be best viewed as an exceptional
case, applicable only where the witness is in a
foreign country. This view is supported by Roberts'
reliance on Barber, not Stubbs, as the controlling
standard in the typical case. It may also be that
the type of hearsay admitted in Stubbs, former trial
testimony, played a determinative role. Such testimony is probably the most reliable form of hearsay; it has been subjected to cross-examination at
trial when the witness was under oath, and the
transcript reduces the possibility of errors in transmission. A less reliable form of hearsay may require a more demanding standard of unavailability.
Both the Federal and Ohio Rules of Evidence set
forth standards of unavailability for the purpose of
applying certain hearsay exceptions. See Fed. R.
Evid. 804(a); Ohio R. Evid. 804(A). Of course, these
standards would have to be read in light of the
constitutional requirements discussed above.
Nevertheless, they do provide guidance and texts
on those rules should be consulted. See 4 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 486
(1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ,804(a)(01) (1981). For a discussion of the
available procedures for producing witnesses at
trial, see Western, Compulsory Process II, 74 Mich.
L. Rev. 191, 283-89 (1975).

First, the statement contained no express assertion
about past fact, and consequently carried on its face
a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight. Second, Williams' personal knowledge of
the identity and role of the other participants in the
triple murder is abundantly established by Truett's
testimony and by Williams' prior conviction. It is inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown
that Williams was not in a position to know whether
or not Evans was involved in the murder. Third, the
possibility that Williams' statement was founded on
faulty recollection is remote in the extreme. Fourth,
the circumstances under which Williams made the
statement were such as to give reason to suppose
that Williams did not misrepresent Evans' involvement
in the crime. These circumstances go beyond a showing that Williams had no apparent reason to lie to
Shaw. His statement was spontaneous, and it was
against his penal interest to make it. These are indicia
of reliability which have been widely viewed as
determinative of whether a statement may be placed
before the jury though there is no confrontation of the
declarant. /d. at 88-89.

For present purposes, the critical aspect of Evans
is the fact that the prosecution made no attempt
to call Williams as a witness. The Court summarily
addressed this point, stating that "the possibility
that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement,
though made, might have been unreliable was
wholly unreal." /d. at 89. As discussed below, the
standard for determining when the "utility" of
cross-examination will be "so-remote" as to relieve
the prosecution of the responsibility for establishing unavailability is extremely important.

The Exception
Although the Court specified the unavailability
of the declarant as a requirement of confrontation
in Ohio v. Roberts, it undercut that requirement by
using the word "normally" and inserting the following footnote:

The Federal and Ohio Rules of Evidence
Traditional hearsay exceptions can be divided into two categories: those exceptions that require
the unavailability of the declarant and those that
do not. Thus, Federal Rule 804 and Ohio Rule 804
require that the unavailability of the declarant be
shown before former testimony, dying declarations, and declarations against interests are admissible. With these exceptions, the hearsay rule
itself demands a demonstration of unavailability.
Thus, the unavailability requirement of Roberts will
not substantially affect these exceptions, except
perhaps to require a more demanding standard in
some instances. Consequently, footnote 7 of
Roberts will not be critical with these exceptions.

A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 ...
(1970), for example, the Court found the utility of trial
confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness ...
448 U.S. at 65 n.7.

In Dutton v. Evans the defendant and two
accomplices were charged with the murder of
three Georgia policemen. Williams, one of the accomplices, was previously convicted in a separate
trial. The other accomplice, Truett, received immunity and was the principal prosecution witness at
Evans' trial. In addition to Truett's testimony, the
prosecution offered the testimony of a man named
Shaw, who had been incarcerated with Williams
prior to the latter's trial. When Williams returned
from his arraignment, Shaw asked: "How did you
make out in court?," to which Williams responded,
"If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." 400 U.S. at 77.
This statement was admitted at Evans' trial under

On the other hand, Federal Rule 803 and Ohio
Rule 803 permit the admission of hearsay statements without a showing of unavailability. A number of common exceptions fall within this category: excited utterances, business records, official
records, and statements of state of mind and
physical condition. The application of the Roberts
unavailability requirement will presumably have a
substantial impact on the admissibility of state4

ments falling within these exceptions. For example, if the prosecution wants to introduce a business record, the hearsay rule does not require a
showing of the declarant's unavailability. Roberts,
__ however, requires the prosecution to establish
" unavailability- unless, of course, footnote 7 applies. It could be argued that in many cases the
declarant would not remember the facts recorded
in the business record and thus the utility of crossexamination would be remote. See C. McCormick,
Evidence 720 (2d ed. 1972) ("the inconvenience of
calling those with firsthand knowledge and the unlikelihood of their remembering accurately the details of specific transactions convincingly demonstrate the need for recourse to their written
records, without regard to physical
unavailability."). It was apparently this view of
business records that prompted Justice Harlan to
write in his concurring opinion in Evans that "production of the declarant is likely to be difficult,
unavailing, or pointless." 400 U.S. at 96. On the
other hand, if the business record is a hospital
report of a physical examination of a rape victim,
see State v.. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348
(1967), it is not so obvious that the declarant would
not remember the event or that cross-examination
would be "pointless." Or, the business record may
be an autopsy report purporting to establish the
cause of death in a homicide case. Crossexamination may be critical if the defendant's
theory is suicide, rather than homicide. How does
the trial court decide? Unfortunately, we have only
Evans, which involved a rather rare combination of
circumstances, as a guide. See also lmwinkelried,
The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative
Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants,
30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979).

The United States Constitution does not require
that this court install a procedural safety valve which
would permit criminal defendants to sit idly by at trial
and during its preparation and which would decimate
established and reliable exceptions to the rule against
hearsay. Defense counsel did not pursue his options
of discovery and compulsory process. Claims of constitutional violations do not disguise the fact that
defense counsel's choice of tactics determined
whether the potential witnesses would testify. !d. at
411-12.

There are two flaws with this analysis. The first involves Ohio Criminal Rule 15, which governs the
use of depositions. Apparently, the Court was
unaware that Rule 15, which was promulgated by
the Court, does not permit discovery depositions.
Rule 15 permits depositions only for the purpose
of preserving the testimony of a witness. See Grim.
R. 15(A)(" If it appears that a prospective witness
will be unable to attend or will be prevented from
attending a trial or hearing ... ).
Second, and more importantly, the compulsory
process argument, if accepted, would mean that
the prosecution would never have to establish the
unavailability of a declarant; it could always argue
that the witness was unavailable because the
defense failed to produce the witness at trial. As
Professor Westen has noted:
The danger here is that the defendant will find himself
in a dilemma: if he stands on the claim of error and
refuses to invoke his right of compulsory process to
produce the witness on his own initiative, the appellate court may conclude that he never had a genuine
interest in an in-person examination of the declarant;
yet if the defendant tries to mitigate the injury by proceeding to produce and examine the witness on his
own, the appellate court may conclude that the prosecutor's error was harmless. This dilemma is obviously
unacceptable, because it would preclude defendants
from ever successfully challenging a prosecutor's
failure to take the initiative in producing a witness in
person. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence tor Criminal
Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 623-24 (1978).

The Compulsory Process Issue
One other aspect of Dutton v. Evans deserves attention. In footnote 19 the Court stated:
Of course Evans had the right to subpoena witnesses,
including Williams, whose testimony might show that
the statement had not been made. Counsel for Evans
informed us at oral argument that he could have subpoenaed Williams but had concluded that this course
would not be in the best interests of his client. 400
U.S. at 88 n. 19.

Furthermore, there is no support for the Ohio
Supreme Court's position in the U.S. Supreme
Court's cases. Although the Court included footnote 19 in Dutton v. Evans, the Court's confrontation analysis did not rely on that footnote. In Ohio
v. Roberts the Court never mentioned the possibility that the defendant's failure to take steps to
secure the witness' attendance at trial was a
crucial factor. Indeed, the Court adopted the opposite position, casting upon the prosecution the
responsibility of producing the witness.

This footnote and the availability of the right of
compulsory process played a crucial role in State
v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St.2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 1122
(1981), in which hospital records were admitted
over a defense objection. At trial the prosecution
offered no evidence establishing the unavailability
of the persons who prepared those records. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the defendant's right of confrontation was not violated.
In support of this conclusion, the court wrote:

INDICIA OF RELIABILITY
In addition to the unavailability requirement,
Roberts provides that the "statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.'"
The indicia of reliability standard is found in only
two of the Court's prior opinions. See Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). For purposes of reviewing the reliability requirement, the Court's
cases are divided into three categories: (1) cases

Prior to trial, defense counsel could have deposed the
preparers of the reports. Grim. R. 15. Likewise, he
could have subpoenaed those same people to testify
at trial. Grim. R. 17.... Rather, defense counsel made
a tactical decision to do neither. Counsel for the defendant, in Dutton, made much the same choice
[citing footnote 19 of Dutton].

5
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in which the hearsay statement is subjected to
cross-examination at the time it was made (prior
cross-examination); (2) cases in which the hearsay
declarant is subjected to cross-examination at trial
(delayed cross-examination); and (3) cases where
there is no cross-examination.

the Court employed the indicia of reliability standard to the admissibility of former testimony.
Stubbs involved the use of former trial testimony
at a retrial. After holding that the witness was unavailable, the Court stated
The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure
that there "are indicia of reliability which have been
widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no
confrontation of the declarant," Dutton v. Evans, ...
and to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement," California
v. Green ... /d. at 213.

Prior Cross-Examination
The prior cross-examination cases involve the
hearsay exception for former testimony, which includes preliminary hearing testimony, deposition
testimony, and former trial testimony in the event
of a retrial. The critical aspect of former testimony
is that the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant through counsel has been afforded. Moreover,
the testimony is taken under oath and the transcript assures accurate recordation. Since, however, the declarant must be shown to be unavailable at trial as a prerequisite for admitting such
evidence, the jury is deprived of the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness.
It was the presence of the safeguards mentioned above that the Court found persuasive in deciding the confrontation issue raised in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In that case, the witness, Porter, had testified at the preliminary hearing, but claimed a lack of memory at trial. The
Court upheld the admissibility of the preliminary
hearing testimony.

The Court then concluded that these standards
had been satisfied in Stubbs because there had
been "an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
[the witness] at the first trial, and counsel ...
availed himself of the opportunity ... " /d. at 216.
The Court relied on Green and Stubbs in holding
that the preliminary hearing testimony in Ohio v.
Roberts satisfied the reliability standard. The only
distinguishing circumstances in Roberts were that,
unlike Green, different counsel represented
Roberts at the preliminary hearing and at trial, and
the witness was called by the defense, rather than
the prosecution, at Roberts' preliminary hearing.
The Court found no significance in the change of
counsel. Furthermore, after reviewing the record,
the Court concluded that although the witness was
questioned on direct examination, the "questioning clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form," 448 U.S. at 70, and there was no significant limitation on the scope or nature of the
cross-examination.

Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing had already been given under circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical trial.
Porter was under oath; respondent was represented
by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later represented him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as to his statement;
and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the
hearings. /d. at 165.

Roberts also indicates that the reliability requirement does not demand an ad hoc evaluation of the
effectiveness of the cross-examination in every
case.

Because the right of cross-examination had been
afforded and the witness' unavailability was not attributable to the prosecution, the Court found
"substantial compliance with the purposes behind
the confrontation requirement .. ."/d. at 166.
The Court had previously upheld the admissibility of former testimony in Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S.
237 (1895). Mattox, however, had involved the use
of prior trial testimony, whereas Green involved
preliminary hearing testimony. Although the Court
recognized that "the preliminary hearing is ordinarily a less searching exploration into the
merits of a case than a trial," it did not find this
distinction critical-at least not under the facts in
Green. "In the present case respondent's counsel
does not appear to have been significantly limited
in any way in the scope or nature of his crossexamination of the witness Porter at the
preliminary hearing." 399 U.S. at 166.
Although the Court upheld the use of former testimony in Green, it did not apply the indicia of
reliability standard. This is due to the fact that that
standard was first used in Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970), which was decided after Green. In
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), however,

We need not consider whether defense counsel's
questioning at the preliminary hearing surmounts
some inevitable nebulous threshold of
"effectiveness." ... We hold that in all but such extraordinary cases, no inquiry into "effectiveness" is required. A holding that every case involving prior testimony requires such as inquiry would frustrate the
principal objective of generally validating the prior testimony exception in the first place - increasing certainty and consistency in the application of the
Confrontation Clause. /d. at 73 n.12.
--

See also State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, 415
N.E.2d 272 (1980). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
did leave unresolved one issue concerning effectiveness; that is, situations in which there is no, or
only pro forma, cross-examination. "We need not
deci'de whether the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly dismissed statements in Green suggesting that
the mere opportunity to cross-examine rendered
the prior testimony admissible .... Nor need we
decide whether de minumus questioning is sufficient, for defense counsel in this case tested [the
witness'] testimony with the equivalent of significant cross-examination." 448 U.S. at 70.
6

Delayed Cross-Examination
Two of the Court's decisions involve situations
in which the defendant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant at trial.
For example, the preliminary hearing testimony in
"' Green was also admissible as substantive evidence under California law as a prior inconsistent
statement in addition to being admissible as
former testimony. According to the Court, the
presence of the declarant at trial "afford[s] the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement." 399 U.S. at 161.
Under these circumstances, the witness is under
oath, is subject to cross-examination, and the jury
has the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor. ld. at 159-61.
Green, however, did leave one issue unresolved.
In that case, the preliminary hearing witness claimed a lack of memory when called to testify at trial.
This factor, of course, undercut the defendant's
opportunity to cross-examine at trial. Nevertheless,
the Court did not explore this point. "Whether [the
witness'] apparent lapse of memory so affected
Green's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the application of the Confrontation Clause in this case is an issue which is not
ripe for decision at this juncture." 399 U.S. at
168-69. The Court remanded the case on this issue.
In Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), a codefendant's statement implicating O'Neil was introduced at a joint trial. The admission of the statement would have violated the Court's decision in
! Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), but for the fact
that the codefendant took the stand and thereby
was subject to cross-examination. "We conclude
that where a codefendant takes the stand in his
own defense, denies making an alleged out-ofcourt statement implicating the defendant, and
proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has
been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments." /d. at 629-30.
In sum, Green and O'Neil indicate that delayed
cross-examination of the hearsay declarant will usually satisfy the reliability requirement. The most
important impact of these cases involves the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements under
Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(a). For a discussion of this issue, see 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
Federal Evidence§ 422 (1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~801 (d)(1 )(A)[04]
(1979); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the
Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 Tex.
l. Rev. 151 (1978).

records, dying declarations, and declarations
against interest fall into this category. Moreover, if
the declarant is not available at the time of trial,
delayed cross-examination is not possible. In this
situation, there will be no cross-examination.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), was such a
case. In that case, the Court made an ad hoc evaluation as to the reliability of the hearsay statement; the Court held that the lack of any memory
problem, the spontaneity of the statement, the declarant's obvious personal knowledge of the underlying facts, and the fact that the statement was
against his interests were sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy confrontation requirements.
After Dutton v. Evans, many courts employed an
ad hoc approach to determine whether the reliability requirement had been satisfied. E.g. U.S. v. Nick,
604 F.2d 1199, 1202-04 (9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v.
Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 917 (1979). See also 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, at 185 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) ("caseby-case approach"); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
Federal Evidence 155-57 (1980). Ohio v. Roberts,
however, indicates that an ad hoc review is not usually required. After positing the reliability requirement, the Court wrote: "Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 448 U.S. at 66. In another part of
the case, the Court commented: "The Court has
applied this 'indicia of reliability' requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection."' /d. at· 66, quoting Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895).
Thus, it could be argued that the reliability requirement is presumptively satisfied when traditional ("firmly rooted") hearsay exceptions are used by the prosecution. This is Judge Weinstein
and Professor Berger's interpretation: "It would
seem, therefore, that the Court's test amounts to
1) unavailability plus 2) traditional hearsay exception." 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 7 (1981 Supp.). The Roberts opinion, however, undercuts this interpretation. If the Weinstein
interpretation is correct, the Court would have only
had to point out that the former testimony exception, which includes preliminary hearing testimony,
was "firmly rooted." Instead, the Court spent time
in determining whether this requirement had been
satisfied in Roberts. This suggests that a more
searching inquiry is demanded, and after Roberts
some federal courts have undertaken such an independent analysis of reliability. E.g., U.S. v. Iron
Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S.Ct. 1709 (1981).
This approach is also supported by the values
underlying the Confrontation Clause. Assume, tor
example, that a defendant's homicide conviction
rests principally on an identification made in the

Absence of Cross-Examination
The previously discussed categories involved situations in which cross-examination occurred,
either prior to trial or at trial. Unlike the former test~mony exception, however, most hearsay exceptions do not require cross-examination at the time
the statement is made. Present sense impressions,
excited utterances, statements of state of mind or
Physical condition, business records, official
7
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form of a dying declaration. In Roberts the Court
cited dying declarations, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8, as an
example of one of the hearsay exceptions that
"rest upon such solid foundation that admission of
virtually any evidence within them comports with
the 'substance of the constitutional protection."'
/d. at 66. Nevertheless, because the evidence is so
crucial and the exception has "long [been] thought
by commentators to be the least reliable form of
hearsay," 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence 7 (1981 Supp.), it is difficult to imagine
the Court mechanically upholding the admissibility
of such a statement without an independent analysis of its reliability. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 64 (1980) ("the absence of proper confrontation
at trial 'calls into question the ultimate integrity of
the fact finding process."').
Roberts also leaves unresolved the problem of
determining which exceptions are "firmly rooted."
A number of exceptions recognized in the Federal
Rules of Evidence are clearly not "firmly rooted."
See Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 427-28 (8th Cir.
1982) (Rule 804(b)(3), statements against penal interests not "firmly rooted"). Other exceptions, although long recognized, have been considerably
expanded by the Rules. See United States v. Iron
Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S.Ct. 1709 (1981) (statement made for medical diagnosis). Exceptions falling into this category must
be subjected to "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts. 448
U.S. at 66.

458 (1938). In other cases the Court has found a
waiver by conduct. See Taylor v. U.S., 414 U.S. 17
(1973); Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). These
latter cases have led some commentators to suggest that a forfeiture, rather than a waiver, theory
is a more accurate description of the Court's decisions. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99, 140-43 (1972).
One of the leading hearsay-confrontation cases
involving waiver is U.S. v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th
Cir. 1982), in which the grand jury testimony and
FBI interview statements of a witness were admitted after the prosecution established that the defendant had murdered the witness.
We conclude that a defendant who causes a witness
to be unavailable for trial for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying ... waives his right
under the Zerbst standard. A defendant who undertakes this conduct realizes that the witness is no
longer available and cannot be cross-examined.
Hence, in such a situation the defendant has intelligently and knowingly waived his confrontation rights.
/d. at 630.

The court also held that the prosecution has the
burden of establishing such a waiver by clear and
convincing evidence. /d. at 630-31. See also
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) ("The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses
against him; but if a witness is absent by his own
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of
that which he has kept away."); Black v. Woods,
651 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 102 S.Ct.
164 (1981) (waiver due to intimidation of witness);
U.S. v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (waiver due to intimidation of witness); U.S. v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (waiver
due to intimidation witness); but see Olson v.
Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1982) (prosecution
must establish defendant's involvement with
threats against witness).

WAIVER
Although a number of recent cases have considered the waiver of confrontation rights in the
hearsay context, the Supreme Court has yet to definitively review this issue. In other contexts, however, the Court has provided a mixed answer. In
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), the Court applied a stringent waiver standard, requiring the prosecution to establish "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." /d. at 4, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
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